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ABSTRACT 
Background: The Malawi government in 2002 embarked on an innovative health care 
financing mechanism called Service Level Agreement (SLA) with Christian Health 
Association of Malawi (CHAM) institutions that are located in areas where people with low 
incomes reside. The rationale of SLA was to increase access, equity and quality of health care 
services as well as to reduce the financial burden of health expenditure faced by poor and 
rural communities. This thesis evaluates the implications of SLA contracting out mechanism 
on access, utilization and financial risk protection, and determines factors that might have 
affected the performance of SLAs in relation to their objectives. 
 Methods: The study adopted a triangulation approach using qualitative and quantitative 
methods and case studies to investigate the implications of contracting out in Malawi. Data 
sources included documentary review, in-depth, semi-structured interviews and questionnaire 
survey. The principal agent model guided the conceptual framework of the study. 
Results:  We find positive impact on overall access to health care services, qualitative 
evidence of perverse incentives for both parties to the contracting out programme and that 
some intended beneficiaries are still exposed to financial risk.  
Conclusion:  An important conclusion of this study is that contracting out has succeeded in 
improving access to maternal and child health care as well as provided financial risk 
protection associated with out of pocket expenditure. However, despite this improvement in 
access and reduction in financial risk, we observe little evidence of meaningful improvement 
in quality and efficiency, perhaps because SLA focused on demand side factors, and paid 
little attention to supply factors: resources, materials and infrastructure continued to be 
inadequate.  
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Introduction 
The Malawi government in 2002 embarked on an innovative health care financing 
mechanism called Service Level Agreement (SLA) with Christian Health Association of 
Malawi (CHAM) institutions that are located in areas where people with low incomes reside. 
The rationale of SLA was to increase access, equity and quality of health care services as 
well as to reduce the financial burden of health expenditure faced by poor and rural 
communities (MNHA, 2005).  
 
Using the SLA mechanism, CHAM facilities are contracted by the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
to provide health care services to people within their catchment area free of charge. The 
government pay the facilities for the materials used in treating the people based on agreed 
price list. The main objectives of the SLA between government and CHAM institutions is to 
improve access, equity, quality and reduce the  financial burden of out of pocket expenditure 
on health  care (Meis and Eldridge, 2007;MOH,2008; EHP; SWAp; GTZ,2009; GIZ, 2011).  
 
While contracting out of health care provision is relatively new in Malawi, empirical 
evidence and experience from countries including Pakistan, India and Denmark (De Costa 
and Diwan, 2007; Nishtar, 2006; Asante and Zwi, 2007; Vrangbaeck, 2008) suggests that 
contracting out of health care provision to private health care providers has the potential to 
mobilize additional resources for the national health system. Nishtar (2004) has stated that a 
public private mix is fostered when government or its agencies contract with the not for profit 
private health sector to increase health care coverage, or the for profit private health sector for 
technical expertise among other things. On the practical side Nishtar (2006) has shown that 
the involvement of the private health sector has increased the capacity of primary health care 
and health outreach programmes in Pakistan. Similarly, it has been argued that, allowing the 
public and private health sectors to work together under a formal and properly regulated 
contract in the provision of health care has the potential to foster the capacity of the health 
system, through sharing skilled human resources, financing of services, physical resources 
utilisation and limiting duplication of services (Aljunid, 1995; Mills et al. 2002; Bustreo, 
Harding and Axelsson, 2003; Thaver et al. 1998). 
 
The foregoing suggests that contracting out is one of the principal mechanisms that some 
governments are using to harness private health sector resources in order to achieve national 
health policy goals (Taylor, 2003). In a contracting out arrangement between public sector 
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agencies and private health care providers, money is transferred from government as 
purchaser to   a private healthcare provider in exchange for the delivery of specified health 
care services.  However, like in all other contractual arrangements, there are bound to be goal 
conflicts within government  between various public agencies and between  the government  
(purchaser) and private health care  providers (agents), but if the potential gains from private 
provision of health care services are sufficiently large, due for example, to availability of 
qualified staff, modern medical facilities, infrastructure and  superior private provider 
efficiency, then contracting out could produce a better outcome. 
 
 Despite contracting out being widely used by public agencies to procure a wide range of  
public service, they suffer a number of limitations such as introducing  new categories of cost 
(Chalkley and Malcomson,2000), due to the cost of awarding, managing and monitoring 
contracts. There is a risk therefore that contracting out may end up being more expensive than 
the traditional procurement mechanism. Similarly, given that private providers may have 
various motives when going into such contracts, some view such transfer of public resources 
as benefiting or enriching the private providers at the expense of the general populace. 
However, in the absence of best alternatives these private providers are used in an attempt to 
meet public health goals through a combination of public financing and private means 
(Harding and Preker, 2003). This therefore suggests that contracting has potential benefits as 
well as limitations and risks. 
 
Rationale for the Study  
The overall aim of this investigation was to explore and better understand contracting out of 
maternal and child health care provision under SLA and its implications for access and 
utilisation of maternal and child health care services at CHAM institutions. Understanding 
the stated and revealed objective functions of the government agencies, CHAM and 
development partners and how these three actors interact through SLA contracts will improve 
knowledge and understanding of factors that facilitate or impinge the success of SLA. This 
knowledge and understanding may help health policy makers in identifying ways to 
encourage the factors that facilitate contracting out health care services and strategically 
address factors that impinge on the success of health care provision contracts. This will 
facilitate the use of appropriate public and private health care provider contracting out 
arrangements that could improve access, utilisation and quality of health care services.  
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Significance of the study 
The study aimed at being scientifically and socially significant.  The scientific significance 
lies in the application of principal agent model and Transaction cost economics (TCE) in the 
contracting out of health care services in a developing country setting. As discussed in the 
previous section, there already has been some attempt to apply principal agent model and 
TCE analysis in the health sector. However, there has been limited use of TCE in situations 
involving low income countries. To warrant a fruitful application in contracting out in low 
income countries it is necessary to understand the specific characteristics of private not for 
profit organisations that can be taken into account in these context. 
 
The social significance can be found in the analysis of alternative institutional arrangements 
at the local government level. Currently, the general tendency is towards contracting out to 
private health care providers. The contracting out arrangement was being implemented in the 
expectation that they will perform more efficiently than public provision of health care 
services. The question is whether this is really the case, especially when not only production 
costs are taken into account, but also transaction costs. Furthermore, the social significance 
can be seen in informing choice between alternative governance structures in the provision of 
healthcare services through better understanding of welfare losses due to transaction costs. 
 
Methodology 
The participants for this study were drawn from both the public health sector (District health 
management team- DHMT) and CHAM institution managers and key personnel. The data 
was collected from 9 facilities in 8 districts around the country. The districts, facilities and 
respondents, were sampled purposively to represent a range of sizes, facilities expected to be 
available and geographical area of the country. The data was collected from August 2010 to 
July 2011. The participants (facilities, districts and respondents) in the sample were 
approached and informed of the study, and their consent requested to participate.  
 
Data collection tools and methods were adapted from Nigenda and Gonzalez, (2009), 
McPake et al. (1999) and Asenso-Okyere et al. (1997) whereby open ended and closed ended 
questionnaires were employed to get information on service level agreements and a survey 
questionnaire was administered at selected CHAM institutions in the sample, followed by In-
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depth interviews, focus group discussions and detailed case studies of 5 CHAM facilities that 
had signed SLA contracts. 
 
Open ended and closed questionnaires in the survey provided information on the number and 
type of CHAM institutions e.g. hospitals, clinics, health centers, diagnostic centers and 
pharmacies to indicate their capacity to provide health care services, the number and type of 
CHAM facilities located and operating in the urban areas like city centers, municipals and 
towns and rural areas. This is an important variable, as where a CHAM facility is located, has 
consequences for access, equity and quality due to factors like distance and availability of 
skilled health personnel, equipment and medical supplies. The survey also provided 
information on the kind of health services that CHAM facilities provide under SLAs and 
information on how health workers and clients (patients) perceive SLAs. 
 
In-depth interviews and focus group discussions provided information on the perspective of 
health care managers and policy makers on the performance (access, quality and efficiency), 
challenges in implementing the policy (negotiation of contracts, non-renewal of contracts, 
non/delayed payment, prioritization issues at the district health office, perverse behaviors by 
both CHAM and government representatives) and how SLAs can be improved (monitoring 
and evaluation, training and commitment by all involved ). Case sites provided information 
on specific service offered, utilization patterns, amount of financial resources the government 
is remitting to CHAM facilities and issues specific to facilities. 
 
Results 
 
In identifying principal - agent relationships, the study relied on the flow of financial 
resources and interview data with policy makers, DHOs, facility managers and frontline 
health care providers. Principal agency relations were traced at three levels: upstream 
relationships between MoH and district health office officials, midstream between district 
health office and CHAM facilities and downstream between CHAM facilities and frontline 
health care providers.  
 
The principal agent relationship between district health officials and CHAM facilities 
emerged from two perspectives. While both CHAM facilities and district health officials 
claimed to share a common objective of providing maternal and child health care services to 
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a needy population, this contrasted with an understanding of varying ‘revealed’ objective 
functions of CHAM facilities and government agencies which contained a range of 
arguments. The objectives of the government and CHAM were key factors in explaining and 
understanding access, equity, quality and efficiency of healthcare services offered through 
SLA, as the objectives affected the relationship between CHAM facilities and district health 
officials. The decision by district officials to contract out CHAM facilities exposed an agency 
problem. CHAM facilities were consistently accused of inappropriate claims by inflating 
utilisation figures and over prescribing medication. Due to weak monitoring and evaluation 
district health officials were unable to ascertain whether the person treated under the SLA 
arrangement warranted the service e.g. allegations of ‘ghost’ patients in some facilities. 
CHAM facilities on their part argued that the district health office did not provide the 
requisite services for SLA patient’s e.g. timely transport for complicated cases to get to 
referral facilities and provision of essential drugs and medical supplies. The foregoing 
indicates that there were information asymmetries which resulted in uncertainty and mistrust 
between CHAM facilities and government agencies. The implications of the uncertainty and 
mistrust are reflected in the difficulties in the implementation and management of SLAs.  
 
In addition to varying objective functions, by contrasting the stated and revealed objective 
functions of CHAM and government agencies in relation to SLAs, the results from the 
contracting out policy indicated that some revealed objective functions within CHAM and 
government as well as between government and CHAM were contradictory. The 
contradictions between stated and revealed objectives partly explain the challenges faced in 
the implementation of SLA. For instance, there were indications in some cases suggesting 
that the objective of CHAM facilities in providing health care services included generating 
financial resources that could be used to pursue and promote their missionary activities, and 
not strengthen the health system. Similarly, there were indications suggesting that 
government objectives included political, and growing public sector activity rather than to 
achieve population health objectives. The problem of conflicting stated and revealed 
objective functions among SLA actors was exacerbated by the presence of multiple agency 
relationships within CHAM and government. 
 
The analysis of multiple agency relations in government and CHAM, involving various 
actors with disparate stated and revealed objectives, provided an understanding of how these 
actors shaped each other’s incentives. The lessons learnt are centred on how the actors 
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reshaped each other’s incentives through various mechanisms such as bureaucratic systems, 
unpredictability of financial flows and capacity problems. Some of the mechanisms used to 
reshape incentives as described here, had unintended consequences or   side effects which 
acted as constraints and raised concern about the effectiveness of SLAs. This suggests that, 
the failure to achieve intended SLA policy  outcomes, is not entirely due to lack of 
knowledge about the process and outcome among  health care managers  and decision 
makers, but rather optimizing agents face incentives  and constraints  that deviate their 
behaviour from  their stated objectives and  intended  outcomes. 
 
The foregoing suggests that, by imposing some constraints on each other, the stakeholders 
under each of the two major categories (government and CHAM) exert some influence over 
resource allocation in SLA.  Given that the relationship between these actors follows the 
principal agent framework, the expectations were that those actors considered as principals, 
would  have control over resources, and be able to impose penalties that would shape the 
incentive environment of their agents. The results indicated that CHAM facilities and 
government imposed such penalties and constrained each other. For instance, the Ministry of 
Health did not pay some facilities and some CHAM facilities ceased providing SLA services. 
However, in some instances the penalties were not strictly adhered to, owing to political and 
economic considerations embedded in CHAM and government relationships. This challenges 
the principal agent framework in that, both CHAM facilities and MoH did not impose strict 
penalties on each other, fearing that doing so would impact negatively on their economic and 
political objectives respectively.  
 
Transaction costs in SLA 
The aim of this section is to tease out the nature of the elements of transaction costs involved 
in the administration of SLA contracts between DHOs and CHAM facilities. Transaction 
costs may arise due to bounded rationality and opportunism of either party to the transaction. 
SLA involves contracting between government agencies and CHAM facilities under 
conditions of imperfect information. The economics of contracting is based on transaction 
costs which arise from the costs of seeking out purchasers and providers arranging, policing 
and enforcing contracts in an environment characterized by imperfect information. Three 
concepts related to imperfect information are bounded rationality, opportunism and asset 
specificity. These are discussed next in relation to SLA contracts. 
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Bounded rationality in SLA 
Bounded rationality recognises the cognitive limitations of the human mind to completely 
evaluate all consequences of possible decisions and future contingencies. In the context of 
SLA, the impact of bounded rationality was demonstrated in part by the knowledge and skills 
CHAM facilities and government agencies had in specifying, selecting appropriate contract 
partners and managing as well as controlling the relationship.  
 
For instance, one of the most important factors in the contractual relationship between 
CHAM and government was the price of SLA activities.  There was a general observation 
that the prices of contracted services increased sharply after SLA contracts were signed due 
to inflation and devaluation of the Malawi kwacha. Failing to provide for this eventuality 
reflected bounded rationality in the periods prior to contracting-out. According to the theory 
of bounded rationality, the complexity and uncertainty associated with long-run decisions 
does not allow a complete specification of the problem at hand. Since information is costly 
and the decision process cannot go on indefinitely, the result of bounded rationality is that 
agent’s satisfice, that is, they stop at whatever decision rule meets the minimal requirements. 
In the case of SLA contracts, the currency crisis came in August 2003 when the currency was 
devalued by 35%, followed by another devaluation of 30% in March 2005. In terms of US 
dollar, the exchange rate rose from K60 to K108, between June 2002 and August 2003.The 
stability of the Kwacha however only lasted until March 2005 when a series of adjustments 
saw the Kwacha resting at K123 against the US dollar (Simwaka, 2011). The initial responses 
of the reserve bank of Malawi were substantial increases in its base interest rate to fight 
devaluation and reduce its pass-through to inflation. The responses of the reserve bank led to 
inflation, especially on goods/services that used imported materials, including drugs, medical 
supplies and transportation costs.  
 
In addition to prices, utilisation of SLA services in most CHAM facilities was higher than 
anticipated by both government and CHAM. The consequences of misspecification, inability 
to predict changes in the economy, specify utilisation figures, contract inappropriate health 
care providers and failure to manage as well as control the relationship have been contract 
renegotiations and termination. These consequences generate extra costs that can be classified 
as transaction costs. 
 
 Opportunism in SLA 
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The conceptualisation of opportunism posits that people act in self interest with guile; this is 
mostly due to incomplete or distorted disclosure of information which results from 
“calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 
1985, pp.47-48).  
 
This suggests that either party to a contract can use loopholes in the contractual relationship 
to their advantage. In the context of CHAM facilities and government agencies in SLA, there 
are signs of opportunistic behaviours being pursued by both parties. This opportunism may 
prevent implementation of the policy program by another party, for instance the resistance of 
some DHOs to enter into SLA agreements, despite central level official approval of the 
policy. This is likely to occur if those at the implementation level suspect that implementing 
the policy may erode their authority or otherwise undermine their interests. This was 
observed in the reluctance of some government agencies to work in harmony with CHAM 
facilities, rather than to concentrate on growing the public service with a view to expand their 
influence.   
 
Similarly, opportunism on the part of CHAM was manifested in the practice of inappropriate 
numbers provided for payment and through overcharging government for transport as 
claimed by government informants, while from the government side, opportunism was 
manifested in the delay and non payment of SLA bills in the full knowledge that facilities 
have provided the services. In addition to this, government agencies had capped prices and 
delayed payments in full knowledge that most CHAM facilities will continue to contract with 
government, as there are few or no alternative purchasers of their services.   
 
Both CHAM facilities and government agencies understand their organizational roles in 
implementing the SLA policy but given that individuals representing the two organisations 
may have objectives different from those of the organisation they represent, they act in  ways 
that prevents  effective implementation of  SLA, through non- payment  or   renewal of SLA  
contracts as illustrated in the results chapters. Examining the multiple agency relations within 
which the SLA policy is implemented it is easy to observe and identify agents that behaved 
opportunistically and prevented proper implementation of SLA by acting in ways that 
constrained the contracting out policy.  
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The result of bounded rationality and opportunism as illustrated here is the probability that a 
party to a contract, CHAM facilities or government agencies will exploit their information 
advantage. This implies that the imperfect information in the SLA contract enabled CHAM 
and government to operate opportunistically by exploiting any information asymmetry (e.g. 
about the true cost of services or quality of services provided).  
 
 Asset specificity in SLA  
Opportunism in a contractual relationship like SLA becomes a threat particularly due to asset 
specificity. While it was relatively straight forward to approximate the transaction cost 
attributes of opportunism and bounded rationality to SLA contracts, the adaptation of 
transaction cost attributes of asset specificity was not. To capture asset specificity, the thesis 
used information on the reported investment by CHAM facilities in the existing and 
additional infrastructure required to provide SLA services. The seeming reluctance by 
government to review prices and renew SLA contracts, but not explicitly stop people from 
demanding SLA services from  CHAM facilities which had expired SLA contracts, point to 
the holdup scenario that is often associated with asset specificity.  
 
Williamson (1985) highlighted asset specificity as a prime condition for “holdup” in 
contracting. In the context of SLAs, CHAM facilities have no immediate alternative party 
with whom to contract without net costs that equal or exceed those resulting from acceding to 
the opportunistic government demands. For instance, the existence of specific assets in SLA 
contracts such as the investment by CHAM health facilities in infrastructure resulted in    
opportunism and increased transaction costs, in the sense that, CHAM facilities capacity 
(infrastructure) has a significantly higher value within SLA contracts than outside SLA. This 
is so, as most CHAM facilities are located in remote and rural areas, where there are less or 
no commercial activities that can utilise the infrastructure, other than the public sector. 
Therefore, if government decided to stop all SLA contracts, CHAM facilities capacity used 
for SLA could not immediately and costlessly be transferred to the production of alternative 
services. The difference in value within and outside the SLA relationship is equal to the SLA 
specific element of CHAM facility assets. 
 
The economic relevance of specific assets is that they create the potential for opportunism 
through hold up. For instance, after some CHAM facilities had made their SLA specific 
capacity investments, government threatened to stop SLA contracts with these CHAM 
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facilities and imposed a capital cost on CHAM facilities equal to the value of the SLA- 
specific elements of CHAM facilities’ capacity investment. Given that government knew that 
CHAM facilities could not immediately and costless transfer their capacity to alternative use, 
government agencies had, in principle capped prices, by negotiating to maintain the 2006 
prices of SLA services. Consequently, because CHAM facilities expected that they could   
lose a share of the return on their specific investments if they withdrew, this has resulted in a 
hold up. One of the economic costs associated with holdups involves the reduced incentive of 
both CHAM facilities and government agencies to make efficient SLA contractual 
relationships, For instance, government not prioritising resource allocation towards a 
mechanism that may help streamline the prevailing challenges in SLA contracts, including 
monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Some of the elements that were thought to be generating transaction costs in SLA contracts 
were acknowledged as: the cost of time staff spent attending meetings and briefings, travel 
costs, accounting and legal fees, consultancy fees and transitional costs such as the setting up 
of HMIS and staff training. The staff cost is attributable to preparation and negotiation of 
contracts and was mostly reported by CHAM facilities as being the most significant cost. 
However, the most noticed transaction cost element for all parties involved appeared to be the 
opportunity cost of time spent by both management and physicians in gathering information 
prior to and during the contract negotiation phase. 
 
The bureaucratic nature of the SLA process entails that the opportunity cost for some 
professionals is high. Since the cost of time spent in meetings by various actors does not form 
part of the cost of the contracted services under SLA, the opportunity cost of time as 
presented here may be considered as a transaction cost. Following from this explanation it is 
possible to discern that time is among the main types of transaction costs; while the others are 
information search costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs, as 
all these activities involve time. Negotiation for SLA contracts is in most cases prolonged, 
implying that SLAs are generating significant transaction costs. 
 
Despite their seeming presence, transaction costs were largely overlooked in the proposal to 
involve private health care providers through contracts, especially in SLA policy design to 
contract out CHAM facilities to provide maternal and child health. Although transaction costs 
can occur during contracting (period 1) or post contractually (period 2), it is usually not 
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feasible and practical for the contracting out parties to address both types of cost at the initial 
contracting stage (period 1) due to bounded rationality.  The equilibrium or outcome in this 
case typically does not maximise access or efficiency.  
 
Interpreting implications of SLAs through principal agent model  
In trying to understand  the implications of the contractual relationship between CHAM 
facilities and MoH officials, principal agent  model seem to provide some insight into the 
objectives  and behaviour of the actors involved,  how they constrain each other and how in 
the process of constraining each other  they affect health care services provided through 
SLAs.  
 
The results of the study suggested that some revealed objective functions within government 
and CHAM as well as between government and CHAM are contradictory. The contradictions 
between stated and revealed objectives partly explain the challenges faced in the 
implementation of SLA.  In addition, the results in this study have shown that contracting out 
health care provision in a multiple agency setting, with similar kinds of conflicting objectives 
can result in opportunistic behaviours by one or both parties, high bargaining contract costs, 
failure to achieve objectives and contract termination.  These results in contracting out 
experience points to the significant transaction costs of such arrangements and the need for 
strong and capable contracting units within the health ministry.  
 
Liu, Hotchkiss and Bose (2008)  have stated that contracting out may give rise to significant 
administrative costs, fragmentation of the health system and that government with weak 
capacity to manage the contracts may not benefit from it, as they might not be able to 
properly monitor private providers. Similarly, the results also highlight that, in circumstances 
where the public sector has contracted out services that are complex, public sector managers 
expose themselves to risk of contract failure, although it is worth pointing out that these same 
transaction costs can threaten delivery of internally produced services. Furthermore, the study 
found that incentives have great influence on both government agencies and CHAM facilities 
and that perverse incentives coupled with uncoordinated policies could exacerbate transaction 
costs, inequality and inefficiency in health care provision through SLA. 
 
The success of contracting out public services lies heavily on understanding the objective 
functions of the contracting parties and management of contractual relationships by defining 
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the functions, procedures and supporting processes. In general, public sector organization 
have more restrictions in their contractual relationship which create gaps between them and 
the contracted out service providers. The public sector organization may emphasize 
implementation of policies rather than seeking maximum benefit.   
 
CHAM facilities objective functions are varied, for instance maximise surplus over the 
contract period, in this case, if a CHAM facility find new opportunities as the contractual 
relationship unfolds, they will seek to capture them. However, if the contract is properly 
drafted, the scope for such opportunities will be limited. Despite this there is still some scope 
to engage in this form of opportunistic behaviour. The implications of such opportunistic 
behaviour by these providers might help them to extract gains through SLA contracts. These 
concerns were reflected for instance in reports of over prescribing and claiming SLA 
payments for “ghost” patients. Analysis of incentive structures can be extremely complex; 
however, many of the incentives operating in health care sector between purchasers   and 
providers can be influenced at least potentially, by  monitoring mechanisms and regulation   
(Mills et al. 1997). 
 
The reality that government and CHAM facility objectives functions conflict is not a surprise, 
however, despite the differences, if the potential “gains from contracting out” are sufficiently 
large due, for instance, to superior CHAM facility’s efficiency, SLA could produce a “win-
win” outcome. Nevertheless, a number of factors associated with the provision of health care, 
especially contracting out its provision involve greater complexity and uncertainty. The 
complexity and uncertainty generates extra costs through activities such as renegotiation of 
the contract. These costs may be large and reduce the likelihood of the government   
achieving its goal of increasing utilisation and coverage of health care services, as the 
government agency may not have adequate financial resources as well as human capacity.  
 
Although there was a systematic increase in the proportion of people utilizing health services 
after SLAs were introduced, the increase in utilization was not always sustained overtime. In 
part this appears to be because the removal of user fees through SLAs was not accompanied 
with additional procurement of drugs, recruitment of health personnel and expansion of 
infrastructure to cover the anticipated increase in demand for services. This imbalance of 
demand and supply factors have lead to several problems including: drug shortages which 
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have resulted in people seeking medical service from private providers thereby exposing 
themselves to financial risk. 
 
In addition, the study found evidence that SLA improved the probability to seek care when 
ill; however, other factors such as living far from CHAM facilities (transport, cost of food 
and accommodation) still acted as obstacles and deterred individuals from seeking care. 
Furthermore, there were some indications that SLA mechanism set up to reimburse facilities 
for the services provided did not translate into additional and timely cash at facility level. 
Most facilities reported experiencing major cash flow problems due to delay in income from 
SLA reimbursement 
 
 
Conclusion 
Government contracting out of health care service delivery to private sector providers is 
increasingly seen as a feasible strategy to improve access, equity and quality in service 
delivery. Findings from this study raise some critical issues; first, it sheds light on what 
determines maternal and child health care services contracting out. This study also offers a 
precautionary  note on countries where contracting out  of health care services is ushering in 
ingenious  ways of promoting universal health care coverage. The disproportional  high 
utilisation rates due to SLA in Malawi may also hold some lessons for  the many countries 
contemplating  or having contracting out  arrangement with a similar mix of providers. From 
policy point of view, the research results on contracting out of health care provision also 
raises concerns about the sustainability of SLA given that the health sector is largely donor 
financed. Future study could focus on the transaction cost implication associated with 
contracting out health care provision. 
 
The main policy implications of the study are that, the objectives of the contracting parties 
(CHAM and government) and   their capacity (financial, skilled personnel and infrastructure) 
are of greater importance in achieving the goals of SLA. There are also conflicts with 
individual actors in CHAM and government who seek to achieve their objective and so doing 
affect SLAs. 
 
Importantly, the incompleteness ( due to information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behaviour) of SLA contracts and the role played by dynamic responses of the government 
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agencies and CHAM facilities helped  to explain the complexity of the contractual 
relationship in SLA. The responses of government and CHAM to each other transformed 
their intended objective of providing health care to underprivileged Malawian and focused on 
surplus and budget objectives respectively. 
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